Within the Madhyamaka tradition, causality is approached through the intimate linkage between dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and emptiness (śūnyatā). All phenomena, including causes and effects, arise only in dependence upon conditions, relations, and conceptual designation; nothing stands alone with its own self-sufficient power. Because of this dependence, causes and effects are said to be empty of inherent nature (svabhāva). Nāgārjuna famously identifies what is dependently arisen with what is empty, suggesting that the very structure of causal arising is itself a display of emptiness rather than a proof of solid, independent entities. Thus, causality is not denied; it is reinterpreted as the functioning of phenomena that lack any fixed essence.

From this perspective, Madhyamaka rejects the idea of an inherently existent causal power, whether in the form of self-causation, other-causation, both, or no-cause at all. None of these positions withstands analysis, because each presupposes some stable, independent entity that could either produce itself, produce another, or stand outside all causal relation. Instead, “cause” and “effect” are understood as conceptual labels applied to a fluid nexus of conditions. This conceptuality does not render causality meaningless; it simply situates causal talk within the realm of conventional designation rather than ultimate metaphysical structure.

The two truths framework clarifies this stance. On the level of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), causal relations function: fire burns, seeds give rise to sprouts, and karmic actions bear their fruits. Ethical responsibility and practical life depend on this reliable, though merely conventional, order. On the level of ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), however, no inherently existing cause, effect, or causal link can be found when subjected to rigorous analysis. Causality, like all phenomena, is ultimately groundless, empty of any discoverable essence.

This vision of causality embodies the “middle way” between eternalism and nihilism. Against eternalism, Madhyamaka denies any fixed, self-powered causal essence or first cause that would anchor reality in an unchanging foundation. Against nihilism, it affirms that precisely because phenomena are empty and dependently arisen, causal transformation is possible and the world of experience is not a mere void of meaning. Causality thus appears as a dependently arisen, conceptually imputed network that functions effectively on the conventional level while remaining empty of inherent nature when seen with the eye of ultimate analysis.