Madhyamaka presents itself as a rigorous unfolding of the Buddha’s “middle way” by insisting that all phenomena are empty (śūnya) of inherent nature (svabhāva). In relation to early Abhidharma schools such as Sarvāstivāda, it shares core commitments to impermanence, non-self, dependent origination, and the Four Noble Truths, yet it refuses to grant even the most basic dharmas any ultimate reality. Where Abhidharma analysis tends to treat dharmas as finally existent constituents—momentary yet still bearing definite characteristics—Madhyamaka regards such ontologies as merely conventional designations, helpful for practice but not ultimately true. Its critique of Sarvāstivāda’s claim that dharmas exist across time is one expression of this broader refusal to solidify anything, even at the most subtle level of analysis.

In dialogue with Yogācāra, Madhyamaka engages another sophisticated Mahāyāna attempt to understand experience. Yogācāra emphasizes consciousness-only, often treating external objects as cognitive constructions while granting a special status to consciousness, including notions such as a foundational mind-stream. Madhyamaka, especially in its Prāsaṅgika articulation, extends emptiness to consciousness itself, arguing that any ontological privileging of mind is simply another form of reification. Thus, while the two schools share a rejection of naïve realism and both stress the illusory or constructed nature of appearances, Madhyamaka refuses to allow even consciousness to stand as an ultimately existent basis.

Madhyamaka also stands in a complex relationship to Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature teachings. Texts that speak of an indwelling buddha-element can seem to posit a permanent, pure essence, which risks sounding like a metaphysical self. From a Madhyamaka standpoint, such language is often read as provisional or skillful, pointing to the potential for awakening or to the emptiness of obscurations rather than to a truly existing core. In this way, Buddha-nature is interpreted not as an inherent substance but as another expression of emptiness, carefully guarded against reification.

Within its own tradition, Madhyamaka develops internal distinctions that shape its interaction with other schools. Svātantrika Madhyamaka employs autonomous syllogistic reasoning and is more willing to speak of conventionally valid characteristics, while still denying any ultimate svabhāva. Prāsaṅgika, by contrast, relies primarily on reductio arguments and is more cautious about asserting even conventional natures. In many later traditions, especially Tibetan ones, Madhyamaka is treated as the most refined philosophical view, with Abhidharma, Yogācāra, and even Svātantrika arranged as progressively more subtle but still partially reifying perspectives. From this vantage, Madhyamaka functions as a critical yet integrative philosophy: it exposes subtle clinging in other systems while affirming their practical value as skillful means within the conventional realm.