Many readers have found in Zhuangzi a liberating vision of spiritual freedom, yet this same vision has drawn sustained criticism. A central concern is the charge of moral relativism: by treating distinctions such as right and wrong as perspectival and fluid, his thought can appear to undermine any stable ground for ethical judgment. From this angle, the playful undermining of language and fixed knowledge seems to erode the very possibility of reliable guidance for action. Some critics go further and see in this stance a slide toward moral nihilism, where the foundations of responsibility and commitment are weakened or dissolved.

Closely related is the accusation of impracticality and social irresponsibility. The ideal of “wandering freely,” of wu wei and spontaneous alignment with the flow of things, is often judged inadequate for governing or addressing concrete political and social problems. Confucian and other critics argue that a philosophy which encourages withdrawal from office, fame, and public affairs risks abandoning those who suffer under misrule. The emphasis on acceptance and flowing with circumstances can appear excessively passive, even enabling injustice by discouraging necessary resistance to harmful conditions or oppressive systems.

Another line of criticism focuses on Zhuangzi’s relationship to reason, language, and consistency. His skepticism about knowledge and his critique of rational argumentation are sometimes viewed as self-refuting: if all claims are limited by perspective and uncertain, then his own teachings would be equally doubtful. The use of argument to question argument, and of language to question language, strikes some as paradoxical rather than illuminating. In this light, the reliance on paradox, jokes, and fantastical tales is said to obscure rather than clarify his philosophical position, fostering an impression of anti-rationalism or anti-intellectualism.

Finally, there are concerns about the accessibility and emotional tenor of the ideal he presents. The carefree sage who wanders beyond conventional distinctions may seem like a figure available only to a privileged or highly cultivated few, giving the philosophy an air of elitism and distance from ordinary people’s needs. His serene acceptance of death and misfortune, including stories of equanimity in the face of loss or physical suffering, has been criticized as inhumanly detached, potentially weakening natural compassion and righteous indignation. For those who emphasize ritual, concrete relationships, and active moral engagement, Zhuangzi’s vision can look too vague, too withdrawn, and too rarefied to serve as a reliable guide for shared social life.