Charvaka grounded its materialist and empiricist orientation in a radical epistemological claim: only direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) yields trustworthy knowledge. All cognition, to be counted as valid, had to be traceable to what the senses can immediately disclose. Inference (*anumāna*), scriptural testimony (*śabda*), and other proposed means of knowing were treated as secondary at best, and often as unreliable, because they ultimately lean on perception for whatever limited credibility they possess. When such indirect means are extended to realms that no one can see—such as heaven, hell, or an immortal soul—Charvaka regarded them as sheer speculation. Knowledge that reaches beyond what can be directly experienced was thus held to be unverifiable and philosophically suspect.

From this standpoint, Charvaka affirmed a rigorously material picture of existence. Reality was identified with the tangible elements—earth, water, fire, and air—and their combinations, and nothing beyond this perceptible order was admitted as real. Consciousness itself was interpreted as a natural property emerging from the bodily configuration of these elements, comparable to how intoxicating power arises from fermented ingredients. On this view, there is no need to posit a separate, immaterial self or a transcendent deity; such entities are neither seen nor required to explain what is seen. The same reasoning led to a denial of karma, rebirth, liberation, and any afterlife, since these notions cannot be anchored in direct sensory evidence.

Charvaka’s critique extended to religious authority and ritual life. Vedic scriptures and priestly claims were regarded as human constructions, subject to contradiction and error, and often serving interests other than truth. Rituals and sacrifices, especially when justified by promises of unseen rewards or threats of unseen punishments, were dismissed as lacking demonstrable efficacy in the here and now. By exposing the dependence of such practices on unverifiable metaphysical assumptions, Charvaka sought to free human beings from what it saw as the burdens of blind faith and ritual obligation. The emphasis fell instead on rational scrutiny of all doctrines, especially those that could not be tested against lived experience.

Ethically, this materialist and empiricist stance issued in a this-worldly orientation. Since only this embodied life is evident, Charvaka held that concern should center on concrete well-being—seeking pleasure and avoiding pain within the limits discernible by experience. Enjoyment was not urged as reckless indulgence, but as something to be weighed against the tangible sufferings that might follow from one’s choices. Moral and practical deliberation, in this light, becomes a matter of empirical calculation rather than obedience to scriptural injunctions. The overall vision is of a life guided by what can be seen, touched, and tested, rather than by appeals to an invisible order beyond the reach of the senses.