Charvaka ethics approached moral life without appealing to gods, karma, or an afterlife, grounding value instead in direct human experience. Only what can be perceived—pleasure, pain, benefit, and harm—was treated as real and knowable, so moral judgments were tied to observable consequences rather than unseen cosmic laws. Right and wrong were not understood as intrinsic properties of actions, but as ways of speaking about what actually promotes or undermines human well-being in this life. In this sense, the Charvaka view is thoroughly this-worldly and empirical, resting on what can be seen, felt, and verified in ordinary life.

Within this framework, pleasure was regarded as the highest good, and pain as what is to be avoided. Actions counted as right insofar as they tended to maximize pleasure and minimize suffering in the present life; those that predictably brought about loss, danger, or distress were counted as wrong. Yet this was not a license for reckless indulgence. Charvaka thinkers emphasized a kind of prudent hedonism: long-term, stable enjoyment was to be preferred over short-lived gratifications that lead to greater suffering, whether through ill health, social conflict, or personal insecurity. Ethical discernment thus required clear-sighted attention to the likely consequences of one’s choices.

Social norms and legal rules were also taken into account, but not as sacred commands. Customs, laws, and shared moral expectations were seen as human arrangements that help maintain order and mutual benefit. They were to be respected insofar as they protected individuals from punishment, conflict, and loss of social support, all of which diminish one’s capacity for enjoyment. When such conventions promoted human welfare and happiness, they could be affirmed as ethically sound; when they did not, they lacked any independent, supernatural authority. In this way, Charvaka ethics remained human-centered, pragmatic, and grounded in the tangible realities of pleasure, pain, and social life.