Mencius understands moral feelings as arising from what he calls the “four beginnings” or “sprouts” that are innately rooted in human nature. These beginnings are not fully developed virtues but initial tendencies that emerge spontaneously, without calculation or external prompting. They are as natural to human beings as the movement of water flowing downward or fire tending upward, and thus reveal a fundamental orientation toward goodness. Moral life, in this view, is not an artificial overlay on a neutral or corrupt nature, but the unfolding of what is already present at the core of being human.

He identifies four basic moral feelings that serve as these beginnings. The feeling of compassion or commiseration is the beginning of benevolence, often illustrated by the spontaneous alarm and pity one would feel on seeing a child about to fall into a well. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness, a natural aversion to wrongdoing or moral stain. The feeling of deference and respect is the beginning of propriety, expressed in courteous conduct and appropriate regard for others. Finally, the feeling of approval and disapproval is the beginning of wisdom, the capacity to discern right from wrong in human affairs.

For Mencius, these moral sprouts are universally present, though not uniformly developed, and they originate from within rather than being imposed from outside by custom or law. Their presence shows that human nature is oriented toward the good, even if this orientation can be obscured or stifled. Education, reflection, and ethical practice are thus understood as forms of cultivation, comparable to tending young plants so that they may grow into their full stature. When these innate feelings are properly nurtured, they mature into the cardinal virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, allowing a person’s original moral potential to come to full fruition.